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NOTES AND COMMENT
upon banks the duty of analyzing every check offered for deposit
by a corporation, and investigating the purposes of the indorse-
ments thereon. This we submit is placing too heavy a burden
upon banks for what in most instances amounts to negligence
and laxity upon the part of corporate officers and stockholders. The
decision is moreover not in keeping with recent expressions of our
courts. 23  The tendency has been to narrow the limits of liability
of banks for fraudulent acts of trustees and agents in dealing with
their principal's property. The Court does not appear to have given




The mortgagor is entitled to the rents and profits of the mort-
gaged premises after the institution of foreclosure proceedings and
pending a sale therein.1 This right is consistent with the equitable
theory of mortgages adopted in this state 2 and the abolition by
statute of the mortgagee's right to maintain ejectment upon the
mortgagor's default.3 There are, however, limitations to this right;
for, having acquired jurisdiction over the property the court may
appoint a receiver thereof to collect the rents and profits, and hold
them for application on account of the debt, in the event of a de-
ficiency. 4 Provision has been made for such appointment, by the
legislature in specified instances, 5 but the courts of equity have long
exercised the power independent of the provisions, and are not lim-
ited in its exercise to the cases there enumerated. 6 The interven-
tion of equity to relieve from forfeiture, resulting in the drastic
changes in the law of mortgages, was not designed to secure con-
tinued use of the property and drain of the profits, to the default-
' Whiting v. Hudson Trust Co., 234 N. Y. 394, 138 N. E. 33 (1923);
Empire Trust Co. v. Cahan, 274 U. S. 473, 47 Sup. Ct. 661 (1927).
' Syracuse City Bank v. Tallman, 31 Barb. Ch. 201 (N. Y. 1857); Whalen
v. White, 25 N. Y. 462 (1862); Rider v. Bagley, 84 N. Y. 461, 465 (1881);
Wyckhoff v. Scofield, 98 N. Y. 475 (1885).
2 Trimm v. Marsh, 54 N. Y. 599 (1874); Howell v. Leavitt, 95 N. Y. 617
(1884); Barson v. Mulligan, 191 N. Y. 306, 84 N. E. 75 (1908); Becker v.
McCrea, 193 N. Y. 423, 86 N. E. 463 (1908).
'N. Y. C. P. A. §991.
'See cases infra note 7; as to application of rents, Syracuse City Bank v.
Tallman, smpra note 1; Cincinnati Nat. Bank v. Tilden, 22 N. Y. Supp. 11, aff'd,
140 N. Y. 620, 35 N. E. 891 (1893) ; Continental Ins. Co. v. Reeve, 149 App.
Div. 835, 134 N. Y. Supp. 78 (2d Dept. 1912).
'N. Y. C. P. A. §974 (adopted from §713 of N. Y. C. C. P. which is dis-
cussed in Hollenbeck v. Donnell, infra note 6).
'Hollenbeck v. Donnell, 94 N. Y. 342 (1884).
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ing mortgagor. The necessity, therefore, of conserving the security,
when threatened with loss or impairment, or where the property
appears inadequate to satisfy the debt, suggests the origin of the
power to appoint receivers and the incentive which moves the court
in its exercise. 7
Upon appointment and qualification, the receiver becomes en-
titled to possession of the property 8 subject, however, to leases ex-
isting at the time of his appointment.9 The rule generally adopted
is that he is entitled to collect the rents accruing from the date of
his appointment 1o and those which have accrued to the owner but
remained unpaid at the time of appointment."- The right of ten-
ants to assert offsets and defenses against receivers, which would
be available in actions by the landlord, has led to considerable
conflict.
A series of decisions have held that receivers are not bound
by terms and conditions of leases executed subsequent to the mort-
gage, and have granted applications of receivers to compel attorn-
ment by tenants without regard to their rights under the lease.12
The reason generally assigned, where this rule has been invoked,
is that the lease being subsequent to the mortgage, the tenant takes
with notice of the mortgagee's rights and the remedies accorded
him in their enforcement. 3
The question most frequently arises in cases where the tenant
makes anticipated payments of rent, and upon appointment, the
receiver makes application to have the court fix the reasonable value
of use and occupation, and direct the occupier to attorn. Such was
the case in Home Life Insurance Company v. O'Sullivan.,4 wherein
the tenant had made a deposit with the owner of the equity, equal
to a monthly installment of rent, which under the terms of the lease
was to be applied to the last month's rent. The Court there denied
the right to set off the deposit as against the receiver, reciting the
"As to when applications will be granted, see 3 JoNEs, MORTGAGES (8th ed.
1928) §1931; 1 WILTSIE, MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE (4th ed. 1927) §557, and
cases cited.
'Citizens Savings Bank v. Wilder, 11 App. Div. 63, 42 N. Y. Supp. 481(2d Dept. 1896), and cases cited mtpra note 1.
'Burtaine v. Barr, 194 App. Div. 906, 184 N. Y. Supp. 796 (2d Dept.
1920).
" Wyckhoff v. Scofield, mspra note 1, at 477; Argall v. Pitts et al., 18 N. Y.
239, 243 (1879).
' Hollenbeck v. Donnell, supra note 6; Wyckhoff v. Scofield, supra note 1.
Fletcher v. McKeon, 71 App. Div. 278, 75 N. Y. Supp. 817 (1st Dept.
1902); Derby v. Brandt, 99 App. Div. 257, 90 N. Y. Supp. 980 (1st Dept.
1904); Olive v. Levy, 201 App. Div. 262, 194 N. Y. Supp. 88 (2d Dept. 1922);
Monro-King & Gremnmels R. Corp. v. 9th Ave. 31st St. Corp., 233 App. Div.
401, 253 N. Y. Supp. 303 (lst Dept. 1931) ; Dow v. Nealis, 93 N. Y. Supp. 379
(1905).
' Fletcher v. McKeon, ibid. at 819, which is referred to in most cases
wherein the rule has been applied.
"4 Home Life Insurance Co. v. O'Sullivan, 151 App. Div. 535, 136 N. Y.
Supp. 105 (2d Dept. 1912).
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rule above referred to. The same rule had been applied in an
earlier case " where the Court enjoined the lessee who had paid
rent for the term in advance, from interfering with the receiver in
collecting rent from the subtenants. It was further suggested that
to uphold the lessee would enable the mortgagor to defeat the mort-
gagee's remedy by leasing the property and receiving the rents in
advance.1'
The application of the rule would be simple if construed to
mean that the appointment of a receiver terminated the tenant's
obligations under the lease. He would then "be free to negotiate
with the receiver; or failing, to remove from the premises. That
such is not the law, was clearly decided in the case of Metropolitan
Life Insurance Company v. Child's.Company."t In that case, the
tenant was made a party to the foreclosure action and final judg-
ment entered therein: The tenant removed from the premises; but
before sale, the plaintiff vacated the judgment and discontinued
the action as to the tenant. The plaintiff, after purchasing at the
sale, sued the tenant for rent under the terms of the lease, and re-
covered. The Court held that until eviction, the tenant was liable
and such eviction did not take place until the sale.' 8
The manifest inconsistency of the two rules places the tenant
in a precarious situation. His rights under the lease may be dis-
regarded upon the appointment of a receiver; but his obligations
thereunder continue until the sale of the premises. In Monro-King
& Gremnels Realty Corporation v. 9th Avenue-31st Street Cor-
poration, the Court attempted to reconcile the rules.' 9 In that case,
the lessee had paid the rent one year in advance. After some three
months, an action of foreclosure was started and a receiver appoint-
ed. The tenant obtained an order requiring the mortgagor, mort-
gagee and receiver to show cause why an order should not be made
permitting it to remove from the premises without further liability;
the claim of the tenant being, that a demand by the receiver con-
stituted a breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment. At the same
time, the receiver moved for an'order requiring the tenant to attorn
and to have the reasonable value of use and occupation fixed.
The tenant's motion was denied, and the motion of the re-
ceiver granted. After reciting the rules supra, the Court stated: 20
"But where, as in the case at bar, the receiver has elected
to disaffirm the lease and has asked for the fixing of the rea-
sonable rental of the premises and, in demanding payment
" Fletcher v. McKeon, supra note 12.
"Ibid. at 281, N. Y. Supp. at 820.
"'Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Child's Co., 230. N. Y. 285, 130 N. E. 295
(1921).
"Ibid. at 289.
"Monro-King & Gremmels R. Corp. v. 9th Ave. 31st St. Corp., suqpra
note 12.
'Ibid. at 307.
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of the sum so fixed by the court, is compelling the tenant
to pay twice for the privilege of occupying the property, the
tenant forthwith has an option either to pay the reasonable
rent or to vacate and surrender possession of the premises
to the receiver. The tenant, however, is not entitled to a
court order in this proceeding, releasing it from liability under
the lease.
"We think that demands by the receiver wholly incon-
sistent with the lease, constitute a complete repudiation of
the lease and permit the tenant to vacate before the date of
the sale. The distinction between the Metropolitan Life In-
surance Company v. Child's Company, supra, and the instant
case, is to be found in the fact that in the instant case, the
acts of disaffirmance of the lease have been performed by
the receiver on behalf of the mortgagee; whereas, in the
Child's case, the tenant, for its own convenience vacated the
premises."
The decision evidences a recognition of the anomalous position
of the tenant, and seeks to pursue a course which will work sub-
stantial justice between the parties; but the broad power thereby
extended to receivers makes the likelihood of its adoption remote.
The receiver cannot be said to be the agent for the mortgagee;21
and it is questionable as to whether or not his election would be
deemed binding on the mortgagee. The Court, furthermore, fails
to take into consideration the possibility of redemption by the mort-
gagor before sale.
The situation has been somewhat clarified by the recent case
of Prudence Co. v. 160 West Seventy-third Street Corp.22 There,
the receiver made application to fix the rental value of premises
occupied by various tenants under co-operative ownership agree-
ments. The agreements provided for the payment of fixed main-
tenance charges which, concededly, were less than th rental value.
In denying the application, the Court repudiated the cases which
have sustained the receiver's right to demand rental value ;23 and
held the rights of receiver subordinate to the lessee's, until a sale
of the premises.
Lehman, J., writing the opinion there states: 24
"A mortgage is only a lien on the mortgaged real prop-
erty. Title remains in the mortgagor and those claiming
"A receiver is a ministerial officer of the Court and the scope of his duty
is purely administrative. * * * He occupies a fiduciary relation, and the utmost
good faith is required of him in his dealings with the property entrusted to him.
He must act impartially in dealing with the parties to the controversy, and not
to espouse the cause or interests of one party against the other." JONES,
MORTGAGES, stpra note 7, at §1951, citing cases.
' Prudence Co. v. 160 West Seventy-third Street Corporation, 260 N. Y.
205, 183 N. E. 365 (1932).
2Ibid. at 209, 210.
'AIbid. at 211.
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under or through the mortgagor, until the lien is foreclosed.
Foreclosure of the lien does not take place upon the com-
mencement of a foreclosure action, but upon a sale under a
judgment of foreclosure. Though, during the pendency of
the action, a court of equity has power to issue interlocutory
orders for the protection of an asserted lien, such orders
must be auxiliary to the right to foreclose the lien, and can-
not deprive any party of a title or a right, which though sub-
ordinate to the lien of the mortgage, survive and are valid
until the lien is foreclosed by a sale under a judgment of
foreclosure."
It would seem, in view of this decision, that tenants in posses-
sion of premises under foreclosure are similarly situated until a
sale therein, whether the lease be prior or subsequent to the mort-
gage; or, if the latter, whether or not they have been made parties
to the action. The rule has been uniform where the lease is prior
to the mortgage, viz.: the lessee is protected where advance pay-
ments have been made in good faith, and is liable for rent accruing
after the appointment of a receiver or then remaining unpaid.25
In light of the Child's case, the decision is unquestionably sound
in theory and affords a more tenable position to the lessee. It is
true that circumstances will arise wherein the mortgagee, through
unavoidable delay in bringing the action to judgment and sale, will
be deprived of a substantial measure of security. Such a situation
does not justify the broad power of interference heretofore exercised.
How far the rule will be extended is not here conjectured. It
should not, however, be seized upon to limit the remedies of the
mortgagee, by application to cases beyond its purport.26
JOSEPHi F. KELLY.
FINANCIAL MISREPRESENTATIONS AS GROUNDS FOR ANNULMENT
OF MARRIAGE CONTRACT.
The plaintiff, who had been keeping company with the defen-
dant for some time, in reply to her constant importunings for mar-
'Isaacs v. Greenberg, 145 N. Y. Supp. 921 (1914).
'That the law in regard to the payment of rent during foreclosure
proceedings has not been entirely settled by the decision in the Prudence
case is evident from a reading of the decision in the case of Holmes v. Graven-
horst, decided by Steinbrink, J., at Special Term, Kings County, under date of
March 11, 1933, reported in Vol. 89 N. Y. L. J. at 1448. In that case the
learned judge held that the decision in the Prudence case swept away completely
the right of a court of equity to fix the occupational rent of premises pending
the foreclosure proceedings tenanted by the owner of the fee.
The writer feels that the Court of Appeals in its decision in the Prudence
case in no way intimated that it intended to do away with the power of a court
of equity to fix the fair and reasonable value of premises occupied by the owner
of the fee pending a foreclosure. It seems from a study of the Court of
Appeals decision that no basis for such an inference can be there found.
